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“Our Nation expects and enforces the highest standards of honor and conduct in our 
military... Every person who serves under the American flag will answer to his or her 
own superiors and to military law, not to the rulings of an unaccountable international 
criminal court.” 
 – President George W. Bush1
Introduction 
 Although the American military is effectively one of the most potent of 
international institutions, discussions of its regulation have been oddly domestic.  The 
court-martial – the single most important institution for disciplining military forces, 
preventing atrocities and punishing offenders – has seen its jurisdiction and procedures 
hotly debated, but most often by those in uniform or individuals interested in domestic 
 
1 Remarks to the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1228 
(July 22, 2002) . 
2military policy.  This paper aims to internationalize the discussion, recognizing that the 
discipline of American military forces is of major concern to both international law and 
U.S. foreign policy.  By exploring the interaction between a major innovation in 
international law – the International Criminal Court – and the extensive clemency powers 
exercised by military commanders under the laws governing U.S. courts-martial, I hope 
to demonstrate that a systematic rethinking of American military justice is now necessary 
in light of changed international conditions.   
 
* * *
The Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by a vote of 120 to 7 
late in the evening of 17 July 1998.  For those voting in favor of the final draft, the lack 
of unanimity – and the presence of the United States and China among the nations 
opposed to adoption – was nearly irrelevant.  For them and many prominent Non-
Governmental Organizations, the mere existence of such a court would help end impunity 
for major crimes against international law, and would act as a permanent deterrent to 
despots and tyrants.2
2 See, e.g., Toni Pfanner, “ICRC Expectations of the Rome International Conference,” 322 INTL. REV. RED 
CROSS 21 (1998) (“an independent and efficient international criminal court would serve as a serious 
deterrent, saving countless persons in the future”); Statement of Louis Michel, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, 11 April 2002 (“[the Court] will act as a deterrent and will help to 
promote international humanitarian law and human rights”), available online at: 
http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=168; Statement by the Permanent 
Representative of Chile to the United Nations, Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdes, on behalf of the member 
states of the Rio Group, 12 November 2001 (“It is our belief that the Court's establishment will also be a 
powerful deterrent against future authors of such atrocities).  But see Michael L. Smidt, “The International 
Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?,” 167 Mil. L. Rev. 156, 188 (2001) (an offender has 
“about as much chance of being prosecuted as ‘winning the lottery’”). 
3The Court as constituted was given substantial powers, as it was intended to have 
the teeth to act as a true international court, reliant only tangentially on the United 
Nations and certainly independent of any particular state.3
The participants in the Rome Conference recognized that the powers of the court 
could invite attempts to capture its authority for political ends.  Consequently, a series of 
checks on the jurisdiction of the court were integrated into the Court’s statute, including 
limits on its territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction.  The most powerful check on the 
new institution, however, was the principle of complementarity: the court would not hear 
any case unless the state or states that would have municipal jurisdiction were “unwilling 
or unable genuinely” to prosecute the offender.4
Complementarity should be a major cause for relief in the United States.  The 
U.S. government has consistently argued that the far-flung military obligations of the 
United States, and its unique role in global security with the end of the Cold War, make it 
uniquely vulnerable to politically motivated prosecutions before the ICC.5 With a half-
century-old system of military justice dating back to the Second World War and with 
roots in British and Roman law, the United States seems well-positioned to avail itself of 
the benefits of complementarity.6 Surely, if complementarity is to mean anything, a 
system of hundred of uniformed lawyers and judges dedicated solely to policing the 
 
3 I discuss the jurisdictional scheme of the International Criminal Court in depth at pages 4-18, infra. 
4 See n. 55, infra, and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Marc Grossman, United States Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "American Foreign 
Policy and the International Criminal Court," Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, DC, May 6, 2002, available online at http:// www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/rome.htm 
(“The United States has a unique role and responsibility to help preserve international peace and security. 
At any given time, U.S. forces are located in close to 100 nations around the world conducting 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and fighting inhumanity.  We must ensure that our soldiers and 
government officials are not exposed to the prospect of politicized prosecutions and investigations”). 
6 The history of our military justice system is addressed at pages 22-23, infra. 
4armed forces must signal an “ability and willingness” to prosecute the grave offenses 
within the ICC’s purview. 
 The United States is justifiably proud of its military justice system.  Changes over 
its history have taken a discipline-centered system rooted in pre-Revolutionary War 
British law and evolved it in the direction of civilian principles of substantive justice.  
With the changes inaugurated with the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, an 
American court-martial is similar in most respects to a civilian criminal trial.  
Nonetheless, military law is rooted in the unit discipline that wins – or loses – wars, and 
this concern, central to military prosecution and absent from civilian criminal law, has 
been the principal point of contention in debates over the future of military justice.  
Traditionally, this dispute has taken the form of a conversation between those who want 
greater commander control over courts-martial, believing this will further the aims of unit 
cohesion and discipline, and those who favor lessened command influence out of a 
concern for the procedural rights of accused servicemembers.7
This paper suggests a different take on this debate.  The emergence of the 
International Criminal Court and the concept of complementarity provides the possibility 
of the U.S. system of military justice being exposed to significant international scrutiny.  
If the U.S. invokes complementarity to block an ICC prosecution, it must be prepared to 
defend the UCMJ before a world body likely to be skeptical of military justice generally 
and the United States’ version in particular.  Exhibit A in the international court’s 
analysis will be the effectiveness of the U.S. court-martial system and the extent to which 
it is viewed as willing to prosecute Americans for atrocities.  And a major component 
will be the influence those in the accused’s chain of command – and therefore those 
 
7 See pages 25-26, infra, and accompanying citations. 
5potentially implicated in their crimes under the doctrine of command responsibility8 –
have over the selection of charges, conduct of trials, and punishment of the convicted. 
 While the question can be viewed from many angles, this paper concentrates on 
one particular element of command influence in the U.S. military justice system: the right 
of a commander to reverse or reduce sentences imposed on convicted servicemembers.  
This example is a telling one for several reasons.  First, this power does not effect the 
conduct or legitimacy of the court-martial itself, but does impact an element of particular 
interest to an international court: sentencing and deterrence.  Second, unlike many 
commander powers that seem to work to the disadvantage of the accused, this power is 
generally accepted as a merciful and praiseworthy part of the overall system.  While 
many of the ways commanders can influence the administration of justice are objected to 
on due process grounds, this particular power avoids that challenge.  Consequently, it is 
one of the less-discussed issues whenever the need for revisions to the UCMJ is 
considered.  However, because this authority could serve as a procedural shield for 
accused servicemembers, it is precisely the sort of command influence most likely to be 
thoroughly examined by an international court considering prosecution of an American. 
 Ultimately, this paper has two goals.  First, to suggest that elements of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice should be re-examined not merely from the point of 
view of due process, as has been done with great ability,9 but also by considering the 
 
8 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) 
(hereafter “ICC Statute”), at Article 28 (establishing criminal responsibility for commanders who are aware 
of crimes committed by subordinates, or reckless with regard to such knowledge, and fail to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent such crimes or submit the perpetrators to investigation and punishment). 
9 See “Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice” (Cox 
Commission), May 2001.  Available online at: http://www.nimj.com/documents/Cox_Comm_Report.pdf. 
The commission, chaired by a retired Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces independently heard testimony and formulated numerous recommendations that were forwarded to 
the appropriate committees of the United States Congress.  Many of the Cox Commissions 
6military justice system’s role as the primary wall between American servicemembers and 
trial by the International Criminal Court.  Second, this paper is intended to join the 
growing chorus of voices10 calling for a systematic review of the U.S. military justice 
system with an eye toward its interaction with the international community and 
international law. 
 
I. The Context: Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
 Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 The Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is limited to “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”11 Specifically, the Court has 
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
crime of aggression.12 The first three offenses are defined in the Statute itself, and with 
the exception of crimes against humanity, are largely uncontroversial.  Defining genocide 
was particularly simple, as the definition was simply borrowed directly from the 
Genocide Convention of 1948,13 a formulation recognized as codifying customary 
international law.14 
recommendations related to concerns over the ability of U.S. military law to “keep pace with… standards 
of procedural justice.”  Id. at 2.   
10 See, e.g., Hon. H. F. Gierke, “Five Questions about the Military Justice System,” 56 A. F. L. REV. 249. 
259-60 (2005).  The author is a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. 
11 ICC Statute, Article 5. 
12 Id. 
13 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277, Article 2.  The United States has been a party to the Convention since 1988. 
(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty1gen.htm). 
14 The Prosecutor verses Jean-Paul Akayesu; Case No. ICTR-96-4-T; Judgment 85, available at http:// 
www.ictr.org/english/cases/Akayesu/judgment/akay001.htm (noting that the Genocide Convention is 
“undeniably considered part of customary international law”).  See also Reservations to the Convention on 
Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 23 (May 28) (declaring the Genocide Convention to be 
customary international law). 
7The definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes, however, were more 
hotly debated.  The definition of crimes against humanity contained in Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute is significantly broader than that contained in the oft-cited Statutes of the 
Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals.15 Specifically, the list of acts included in Article 7, 
paragraph 1 includes rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence as possible actions 
triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.16 The list further includes forced transfer of 
population, enforced disappearance of persons and apartheid among prohibited acts.17 
Such acts, however, must be committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”18 and there must 
be “multiple commissions of [the specified act]… pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such attack.”19 These last requirements significantly 
limit the scope of ICC jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, even given the 
comparatively broad list of offenses in paragraph 1.  Because they must be directed 
against a civilian group, and because there must be a state policy to commit such attacks, 
it will be comparatively difficult to prove a charge of crimes against humanity.  The 
numerous elements of the offense, and the evidentiary difficulty of proving them, makes 
the successful prosecution of a United States soldier or civilian leader for crimes against 
humanity unlikely.  
 
15 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 31 
(1999).   
16 ICC Statute, Article 7. 
17 Id.   
18 ICC Statute, Article 7(1). 
19 ICC Statute, Article 7(2)(a). 
8War crimes, however, do not have these heavy evidentiary requirements, and 
consequently the definition of war crimes should be of particular interest to the United 
States, with its vast, widely deployed military.  The Rome Statute divides war crimes into 
four categories:20 “(a) [g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949”; 
“(b) [o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law”; (c) [i]n the case of an 
armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to 
the four Geneva Conventions”; and “(d) [o]ther serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the 
established framework of international law.”21 The United States is unlikely to be 
responsible for war crimes committed in “armed conflict not of an international 
character,” but even the provisions of Article 8 that deal with international conflicts pose 
problems.  Paragraph (b) borrows heavily from the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, a 1977 update to which the United States is not a party.22 The rules 
contained in paragraph (b) severely restrict a state’s discretion to choose means of 
combat it considers appropriate to the military situation on the ground by enforcing a 
particularly high duty of care toward civilians.  While many of the rules derived from the 
First Protocol could be considered binding under customary international law, the Rome 
Statute still contains innovations -- including a provision prohibiting an occupying power 
 
20 This organizational structure was adopted to simplify negotiation, but survived to the final draft.  
Arsanjani, supra note 5, at 33. 
21 ICC Statute, Article 8. 
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3  While not a party, the 
United States is a signatory to Protocol I.  Http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=S. 
9from transferring its own people into an occupied territory.23 Similarly, “intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or 
charitable purposes…” are outlawed.  While protection of religious, art, science or 
charitable purposes are based on the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
of 195424 -- to which the United States is not, in any event, a party25 -- the language 
protecting educational sites is an innovation suggested by New Zealand and Switzerland 
at the Rome Conference itself.26 
While similar expansions of the scope of crimes against humanity are tempered 
by the requirement that there be multiple acts and they be part of an organized policy,27 
this is not true for war crimes.  The final language of the Statute states that “[t]he Court 
shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.”28 While the Court 
is guided to take jurisdiction of a suspected war crime only when part of large-scale 
policy, the words “in particular” make it clear that this is not a requirement.  The 
language does not preclude jurisdiction over a single act defined in Article 8(2), and says 
nothing about the rank or status of the person committing that single act.29 Indeed, as a 
 
23 Christopher M. Van de Kieft, “Uncertain Risk: The United States Military and the International Criminal 
Court,” 23 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 2325, 2333 (2002). 
24 See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 
249 UNTS 240.   
25 http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E 
26 Arsanjani, supra note 9, at 34. 
27 ICC Statute, Article 7(2)(a). 
28 ICC Statute, Article 8(1). 
29 “Even though both the International Law Commission and the pre-Rome negotiations considered 
suggestions to limit the competence of the Court to the leaders of those responsible for such crimes, the 
Rome Conference decided otherwise. The negotiators reasoned that the crimes listed in the Statute are so 
grave that their prosecution cannot be limited to a handful at the top; no one who has committed such 
crimes should escape prosecution and, if appropriate, punishment.  See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. 
Michael Reisman, “Developments at the International Criminal Court: the Law-in-Action of the 
International Criminal Court,” 99 A.J.I.L. 385, 399 (2005).  Arsanjani and Reisman go on to consider how 
resource scarcity may require the Court to focus on atrocity leadership, and that, perhaps, extension of 
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severe but legally sound example, the decision by a junior officer to direct fire toward 
snipers using a religious structure for cover could serve as a basis for a war crimes 
indictment under certain circumstances.30 The lack of textual guidance essentially throws 
the entire question back on the Court’s discretion under Article 17(1)(d) to determine 
whether a case is of “sufficient gravity to justify” its consideration. 
 The crime of aggression, the last set forth in the Statute, was not defined.  The 
Rome Statute essentially punts the question, stating that “[t]he Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted… defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to this crime.”31 Such a definition must take the form of an amendment to the 
Statute itself.32 This cannot be proposed until seven years have passed from the entry 
into force of the Statute, and must be passed by a two-thirds vote of the States Party.33 
Notably strict protections are in place to prevent the majority from forcing an expansion 
of the core crimes on a minority.  If any state opposes an amendment to the definitions of 
crimes found in article 5 through 8, “the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding 
a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on 
 
prosecutions to lower-ranking persons must be done “henceforth, if at all, only episodically or 
opportunistically.” 
30 The Court would be required to find that this order had no “military objectives.”  ICC Statute, Article 
8(2)(b)(ix).  However, the potential political fallout from such a situation is clear, and there is no reason to 
believe that international judges with no experience of combat are better qualified than a U.S. court-martial 
to decide such a fact-specific question -- especially given the ICC’s very limited resources and the 
difficulty of procuring evidence in a combat zone.  These are precisely the sorts of concerns that led to 
limited ICC jurisdiction in the first place.  See Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
“Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor” at pages 2-4 available online at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (discussing the need to carefully select 
targets of investigation given the Office’s limited resources and the difficulties of on-the-ground 
investigations). 
31 ICC Statute, Article 5(2). 
32 See Id. 
33 ICC Statute, Article 121. 
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its territory.”34 This broad exemption significantly undermines concerns that states party 
could be “trapped” by an overly expansive definition of the crime of aggression.  In 
addition, the statute provides that “[i]f an amendment [is] accepted by seven-eighths of 
States Parties… any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw 
from this Statute with immediate effect.”35 This provides yet another protection for states 
party against an overzealous expansion of the definition of crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.   
It is essential to note however, that these protections apply only to States Party.  If 
a party rejects an amendment to the definition of a crime, both its nationals and its 
territory are outside the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to that crime.  An example 
involving two fictional countries may help illustrate the point.  If a definition of the crime 
of aggression is adopted, and State A were to reject the amendment, its nationals could 
not be tried for the crime of aggression regardless of where the crime occurred.  On the 
other hand, if State A were to accept the amendment the definition would apply to crimes 
committed on its territory.  If State Y (a non-party) were to commit an act of aggression 
on State A’s territory, State Y’s nationals would not be able to avail themselves of the 
immunity provision available to a State Party.  Rather, the Court’s jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on State A’s soil would remain intact.  However, if State A had chosen 
not to accept the new definition of aggression, State Y’s citizens could not be tried for 
any acts of aggression taken on Party’s soil. 
The hypothetical reveals another point.  Because the Court can only take 
jurisdiction over aggression if the state being attacked is a party, states needing the threat 
 
34 ICC Statute, Article 121(5) (emphasis added). 
35 ICC Statute, Article 121(6). 
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of ICC prosecution to secure their territorial integrity are likely to accept whatever 
definition is offered.  These are also precisely the same states that are likely to push for a 
particularly robust definition of aggression.  Strong states party will consequently be left 
with a choice: accept a robust definition and ICC jurisdiction over their troops abroad, or 
reject it, and win immunity for those same troops.  Provided a strong state can dispense 
with the deterrent effect of ICC jurisdiction over its territory, there is little incentive for it 
to accept any definition of the crime of aggression: by rejecting the definition, they win 
free use of their troops abroad.36 This is a strong argument for powerful, aggressive 
states becoming states party in order to avail themselves of this protection.  It is also a 
potentially serious flaw in the ability of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over precisely 
those states most likely to commit a crime of aggression.  It is always possible, of course, 
that the whole system is at least implicitly targeted at the only states that can lose out on 
this bargain: non-parties.  
While much of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is premised on crimes 
defined either by widely accepted treaties or customary law, several concerns remain.  
The most pressing is the scope of the war crimes language in the Statute.  Combining a 
wide range of prohibited acts and minimal checks on the required scope of their 
consequences, the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction provides enormous leverage for the 
Court to second-guess decisions made in the field.  There is nothing, outside of the 
Court’s own self-regulation, to prevent a war crimes charge for a single targeting of an 
educational institution.  Given the likelihood for international outcry over sufficiently 
terrible, if honest, mistakes under battlefield conditions, and the necessary lack of 
 
36 As regards the crime of aggression: the ICC would retain jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. 
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omniscience in intelligence gathering, the war crimes jurisdiction of the ICC is ready-
made for a political prosecutor.  Similarly, the Crime of Aggression has yet to be defined, 
but the mechanisms for its future definition are fraught with potential for gamesmanship, 
and should make responsible nations wary of the result.   
 
Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction 
The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction may be exercised if “one or more 
of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Court in accordance with paragraph 3: 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question 
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or 
aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; 
 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
 
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may… accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with 
respect to the crime in question.”37 
This jurisdiction is significantly narrower than that suggested by some states.  Some 
proposed a scheme grounded in the concept of universal jurisdiction, which would have 
shackled the Court with very few constraints concerning jurisdiction ratione personam or
ratione territorium.38 Even a more modest Korean proposal, which would have allowed 
jurisdiction if a range of states were parties to the statute – the state having custody of the 
accused, the state where the crime was committed, the state of the accused’s nationality, 
 
37 ICC Statute, Article 12.  It should be noted that these restriction apply only to cases where the Prosecutor 
initiates an investigation on his own authority or on referral of a State Party: cases referred by the United 
Nations Security Counsel meets with no such restrictions.  Id. 
38 Johan D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2000).  
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or the state of the victim’s nationality39 – did not end up in the final draft despite 
significant support during the drafting process.40 The final statute seems to reflect a 
compromise with the final United States position, which would have allowed jurisdiction 
if both the territorial state and the national state of the accused were parties to the 
Statute.41 In any event, the final version of the Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on the territory, or by the nationals, of ratifying states.  Consequently, 
a state cannot shield its nationals from prosecution for crimes committed on the territory 
of another state.42 
The Statute does allow states to block ICC jurisdiction under specific 
circumstances.  First, a state, on becoming a party to the Statute, may invoke a one-time 
seven-year immunity against prosecutions for war crimes committed by its nationals or 
on its territory.43 Second, and more controversially, Article 98 provides that: 
“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to 
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.”44 
The United States has interpreted this section as allowing for bilateral agreements 
whereby a state may promise not to surrender nationals of a foreign state to the Court.45 
This is by no means a universally accepted interpretation – the European Union for 
instance views such provisions as inconsistent with the “object and purpose” of the treaty, 
 
39 Proposal Submitted by the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.6 (1998). 
40 Van der Vyver, suprq note 31, at 62. 
41 Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/C.1/L.70 (1998). 
42 With the exception of the narrow case described above where a state party rejects an amendment putting 
forward a definition of the crime of aggression. 
43 ICC Statute, Article 124. 
44 ICC Statute, Article 98(1). 
45 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, American Justice and the ICC, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 2003, at A21. 
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and hence invalid.46 While the validity of such agreements has not yet been tested, 17 
states47 have concluded Article 98 agreements promising not to surrender U.S. nationals, 
suggesting that there is at least some significant support for the United States position. 
 Finally, the United Nations Security Council – in a nod to its prime responsibility 
under the U.N. Charter to safeguard “international peace and security”48 – may block an 
investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months by so 
“requesting.”49 This provision has in fact been invoked.  On June 30, 2002, the United 
States vetoed a resolution extending the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission to 
Bosnia.50 In order to lift its veto, the United States demanded an Article 16 resolution 
exempting from ICC jurisdiction any peacekeepers of states not party to the Treaty of 
Rome.51 After an extensive debate, the Security Council opted to invoke Article 16 to 
protect “current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to 
the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or 
 
46 “The Assembly considers that these “exemption agreements” are not admissible under the international 
law governing treaties, in particular the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, according to which 
States must refrain from any action which would not be consistent with the object and purpose of a treaty.”  
Risks for the Integrity of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Eur. Parl. Assemb., 2002 Sess., 
Res. 1300 (2002), referencing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 18 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 678 (1979).  See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15; see also Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law: U.S. Bilateral Agreements Relating to ICC, Edited by Sean D. Murphy, 97 A.J.I.L. 200, 
202 (2003). 
47 As of January 2003.  See Contemporary Practice, Id. at 201. 
48 U.N. Charter, Article 39. 
49 ICC Statute, Article 16. 
50 See Thomas M. Franck and Stephen H. Yukan, The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
Unilateralism Rampant, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 519, 524 (2003). 
51 Id. 
16
authorized operation.”52 The Council also expressed an intention to renew the resolution 
each year,53 although the resolution was only renewed once.54 
While Articles 16 and 98 do provide potential limits to the Court’s jurisdiction, 
they rely on specific political action, specifically bilateral negotiations and resolutions of 
the Security Council.  The greatest and most pervasive check on ICC jurisdiction is, 
however, a structural one: the principle of complementarity whereby the Court may 
conduct a prosecution for the most heinous offenses against international law if and only 
if states are unable or unwilling to do so themselves.   
 Complementarity is a relatively new principle in international law.  The very 
word was given a radically new meaning by the International Law Commission in its 
Draft Statute,55 where it was first used to connote complementarity between legal 
systems.56 The draft’s Third Preambular Paragraph suggested that the Court “be 
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures 
may not be available or may be ineffective.”  In its commentary on this clause, the ILC 
noted that the Court would be intended for cases where there would be “no prospect” of 
an accused being duly tried in national courts, and that it was not intended “to exclude the 
existing jurisdiction of national courts, or to affect that right of States to seek extradition 
 
52 SC Res. 1422 (July 12, 2002).  The decision has been strongly criticized as contrary to the spirit of the 
Rome Charter.  See generally Mohamed El Zeidy, “The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of 
Article 16 of the ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422,” 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1503 (2002). 
53 Id. 
54 SC Res. 1487 (June 12, 2003).  Subsequent attempts by the United States to renew the resolution were 
unsuccessful.   
55 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 46th Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994). 
56 Van der Vyver, supra note 31, at 66.  Professor van der Vyver points out that the most common technical 
use of the term prior to the ILC Draft Statute was in Roman Catholic teaching, where it was used to 
“denote a certain symbiosis in the relationship between the sexes.”  Id. 
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and other forms of international judicial assistance under existing arrangements.”57 
While any complete exploration of the ILC’s view of complementarity is complicated by 
the lack of specific references to it in the actual language of the proposed ICC Statute, 
this commentary betrays a relatively unambitious vision of the court: The 
recommendation that the ICC be used only where “trial procedures may not be available 
or may be ineffective” suggests that only when national courts were unable to prosecute 
would the ICC be an appropriate forum.  The particularly high bar that there be “no 
prospect” of an effective national prosecution would seem to allow states ample 
opportunity to hedge and stall the functioning of their judicial machinery without 
triggering the Court’s jurisdiction.  In essence, the ILC does not appear to have 
considered the scenario where a state would actively use its judiciary as a shield against 
ICC jurisdiction, or viewed such action without great alarm, and its vision of 
complementarity does not, as a result, have the teeth later found in the Rome Statue itself. 
Yet, while the ILC’s vision of the Court’s jurisdiction was undeniably weaker 
than the Court’s final powers under the Rome Statute, complementarity remains one of 
the cornerstones of the ICC regime58 and its central jurisdictional innovation.59 The 
Tenth Preambular Paragraph of the ICC Statute proclaims that “the International 
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
 
57 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 46th Session, supra note 48, at 44, para. 
(1). 
58 ICC Statute, Article 1. 
59 The tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda both proceeded on the opposite assumption: that 
their jurisdiction specifically overrode that of national courts.  Statute of the Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, art. 9(2), S.C.Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES827 (1993); Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 
8(2), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994).  Available online at 
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm (ICTY) and 
http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (ICTR).  It should be noted that the ICTY has the 
authority under Rule 11bis of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence to essentially “remand” cases to national 
courts for prosecution.  ICTY R.P. & Evid. 11bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/rev.22 (2001).  
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jurisdiction.”60 Remedying the defect of the ILC Draft, the Rome Statute spells out the 
practical effect of this complementarity in Article 17, under the heading of “Issues of 
Admissibility”:  
“Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall 
determine that the case is inadmissible where:  
 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely 
to prosecute; 
 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
Article 20, paragraph 3;61 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.”62 
The statute is clear that national courts have the first right and duty to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes, and that ICC jurisdiction is available only to 
complement that responsibility.  But the ICC is empowered to intervene not only where 
existing national judicial machinery is insufficient to allow a successful prosecution, but 
also where national governments are unwilling to fulfill their responsibility to prosecute.   
 
60 ICC Statute, preamble. 
61 While the principles of Article 20 enshrine a broader conception of double jeopardy than that available 
under United States domestic law, in so far as double-jeopardy protection applies to the underlying conduct 
instead of any particular charge, Paragraph 3 stipulates instances where the principle of ne bis in idem will 
not apply.  These include where the purpose of an earlier trial was to shield the defendant from criminal 
responsibility, or where the proceedings were not conducted independently and impartially or in 
accordance with due process as recognized by international law.  Cf, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 
688, 703-704 (1993) (noting that U.S. double jeopardy protections attach unless each crime contains an 
element not present in the other, and specifically overruling precedent suggesting that two crimes may not 
be charged from the same conduct). 
62 ICC Statute, Article 17. 
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Article 17(2) of the Statute gives the Court concrete guidance should it be forced 
to evaluate a state’s willingness to prosecute: 
“In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, 
having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, 
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: 
 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court…; 
 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice; 
 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently 
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner 
which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.”63 
This language preserves the deference to national courts embodied in the “Issue of 
Admissibility” section found earlier in Article 17.  The standard is set very high: only a 
complete refusal to prosecute or a fatally flawed proceeding can defeat the state’s 
presumptive right to bar ICC jurisdiction by initiating its own prosecution.  Even a 
refusal or flawed proceeding may only be ignored if a specific intent element is met: the 
state must be acting for the purpose of shielding the relevant individual from criminal 
liability.  This intent element is most strongly evidenced by the language of 12(2)(c), 
where even a biased proceeding may only be branded an “unwilling prosecution” if it is 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”  This question of 
the state’s “intent” is therefore central to the ability of the ICC to take jurisdiction of a 
case that has already been investigated or prosecuted by a national court.   
 
63 ICC Statute, Article 17(2). 
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While the evidentiary bar is certainly set rather high, the provision remains a 
major expansion of the complementarity provision of the Draft Statute since the Court 
itself would determine whether a national judiciary’s actions are “consistent with an 
intent to bring the accused to justice.”  In short, while the statute may seem principally 
concerned with protecting national court jurisdiction, in fact it invites the Court to 
evaluate national court decisions to a previously unparalleled extent.64 A national 
investigation or prosecution prevents ICC jurisdiction only when the ICC itself says it 
does. 
 To summarize and recap, ICC jurisdiction may threaten the United States in 
several ways.  First, the expansive definitions of the crimes included in the Rome Statute 
may impose harsher standards of behavior on United States nationals than those accepted 
at present by U.S. officials.  Second, as a non-party, the U.S. has no say over any future 
definition of the crime of aggression, and it is always possible that it will be defined so as 
to implicate actions taken by U.S. forces operating abroad.  Third, the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over all crimes committed on the territory of states party puts U.S. forces at risk 
whenever they operate on such territory.  Finally, the principle of complementarity which 
is supposed to protect states against unwise or unjust prosecutions by the court is, in 
practice, a matter for the discretion of the Court.  There is, at bottom, no way to ensure 
that Americans will not be exposed to the ICC’s jurisdiction, and thus held to legal 
standards that the U.S. cannot control. 
 
United States’ Reaction to the ICC: a Policy of Opposition 
 
64 As noted above, the ICTY simply supplanted Yugoslav jurisdiction – but did so not as a matter of 
judicial process, but rather at the command of the U.N. Security Counsel.   
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The United States’ reaction to these realities of the Rome Statute was at first 
mixed.  While the United States “had not achieved the silver bullet of guaranteed 
protection [for U.S. nationals],” the chief American negotiator at the Rome Conference 
argued that a “sophisticated matrix of safeguards” checked the ability of the Court to 
initiate politically motivated prosecutions.65 President Clinton chose to sign the Statute 
on December 31, 2000 – the last day it was open for signature.66 In doing so, he 
expressed hope that “a properly constituted and structured [Court] would make a 
profound contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide,” and 
emphasized that “the treaty requires that the ICC not supercede or interfere with 
functioning national judicial systems”67 However, he noted “significant flaws” – 
principally that U.S. personnel could still come under the Court’s jurisdiction without 
U.S. ratification – and demanded a “chance to observe and assess the functioning of the 
court” before acquiescing to its claimed jurisdiction.68 He characterized the signature as 
an opportunity to “influence the evolution of the court” while explicitly declining to 
recommend submission of the treaty for Senate ratification.69 
The newly elected Bush administration was yet more hostile, evidencing no 
interest in cooperating with the Court and specifically disavowing any intention of 
becoming party to the Treaty or abiding by the legal consequences of President Clinton’s 
signature.70 The Congress was yet more direct: only three days after the Administration 
 
65 David J. Shceffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 
63 (2001). 
66 See Statement on the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4
(January 8, 2001). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Rejects All Support for New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 
A11. 
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formally disavowed any connection with the Court, then-House Majority Whip Tom 
DeLay introduced the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA).71 Signed into 
law later that year, ASPA72 bluntly states that “the United States will not recognize the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over United States nationals.”73 
ASPA’s anti-ICC rhetoric comes with impressive enforcement mechanisms.  
Section 2004 prohibits any federal, state, or local agency – including courts – from 
providing support for or extraditing to the ICC. 74 Similarly, it prohibits agents of the 
Court from conducting any investigation on American soil and requires the United States 
to: 
exercise its rights to limit the use of assistance provided under all treaties and 
executive agreements for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, multilateral 
conventions with legal assistance provisions, and extradition treaties, to which the 
United States is a party, and in connection with the execution or issuance of any 
letter rogatory, to prevent the transfer to, or other use by, the International 
Criminal Court of any assistance provided by the United States under such treaties 
and letters rogatory.”75 
ASPA also places severe limitations on when and how American forces may be used 
abroad if they may be subject to ICC jurisdiction.  In addition to barring any transfer of 
intelligence likely to end up in the Court’s hands,76 the United States is prohibited from 
giving any military assistance to states party to the Rome Statute.77 This requirement 
may be waived by the President if he finds that it is important to the national interest to 
 
71 H.R. REP. NO. 107-62, pt. 1 (May 9, 2001). 
72 American Servicemember’s Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7421-7433, PUB. L. NO. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 
(2002). 
73 Id. at § 7421. 
74 22 U.S.C. §7423. 
75 Id. 
76 22 U.S.C. §7425 
77 22 U.S.C. §7426.  This prohibition does not extend to the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization,  major non-NATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, South Korea, 
New Zealand), and Taiwan.  Id. It is significant that the President is required to investigate the degree to 
which American forces may be put at risk of prosecution even while engaged in operations in support of 
such close alliances as these, and to take whatever means he may to minimize this danger through 
appropriate command and operational control arrangements.  22 U.S.C. §7428. 
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do so, or if a foreign state negotiates an Article 98 agreement shielding American forces 
from ICC prosecution.78 However, the statute also prohibits absolutely the participation 
of U.S. forces in United Nations peacekeeping operations unless either (1) the Security 
Council invokes its Article 16 authority in order to shield American troops or, (2) the 
countries where U.S. forces will be located do not trigger the Court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.79 
Finally, and most ominously, 22 U.S.C. §7427 is titled “Authority to Free 
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States and Certain Other Persons Detained 
or Imprisoned by or on Behalf of the International Criminal Court.”  Therein, “the 
President is authorized to use all force necessary and appropriate to bring about the 
release” of certain American personnel.80 While the Act is careful to eliminate “bribery 
or other inducements” from the tools available to the President in securing the release of 
a suspect,81 it is difficult to imagine that action to forcibly free a prisoner of the Court 
would not be authorized by this section. 
The findings of ASPA could not be clearer: the policy of the United States is to 
shield American troops from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.  It is 
possible that brute American power may be able to accomplish this objective.  But it is 
also possible that it will not, and in that eventuality the United States may be forced to 
 
78 22 U.S.C. §7426.  This authority has been exercised on numerous occasions.  See, e.g. Memorandum 
Waiving Prohibition on United States Military Assistance to Parties to the Rome Statute Establishing the 
International Criminal Court, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 851 (July 7, 2003) (exempting 22 countries by 
Presidential waiver). 
79 22 U.S.C. §7424.  See Memorandum on Certification Concerning U.S. Participation in the U.N. Mission 
in Liberia Consistent with Section 2005 of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 39 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1439 (October 27, 2003) (certifying that American troops were “without risk” of 
prosecution by the ICC due to Security Council waiver under Article 16 of the Rome Statute). 
80 22 U.S.C. §7427.  The relevant persons are “members of the Armed Forces of the United States, elected 
or appointed officials of the United States Government, and other persons employed by or working on 
behalf of the United States Government, for so long as the United States is not a party to the International 
Criminal Court.”  22 U.S.C. §7432(4). 
81 22 U.S.C. §7427(d). 
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think in the Rome Statute’s own terms.  For all ASPA’s bluster, the Rome Statute’s 
principle of complementarity may provide a cleaner way around the threat of ICC 
prosecution: if the United States is willing to undertake a “genuine” investigation and 
prosecution of military personnel who commit crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
by its own Statute the Court will be unable to act.  Since military personnel are 
prosecuted by the military justice system, this poses a question of the ability of that 
system to forestall ICC jurisdiction under the Rome Statute.  If American military law 
provides for the criminalization of behavior prohibited by the Rome Statute, and if the 
investigations and prosecutions undertaken by the U.S. military are “genuine” within the 
meaning of Article 17, then American troops will likely be beyond the ICC’s reach.82 
II.  The Problem: Distinctive Elements of the U.S. Court-Martial System 
 American military justice underwent a sea change between the Second World 
War and the Korean conflict.  The separate Articles of War and Articles for the 
Government of the Navy – passed by the Second Continental Congress and rooted in pre-
revolution British military law – were supplanted by the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ).83 The old Articles were command-centered, with courts-martial viewed 
as extensions of the military commander’s disciplinary powers instead of as independent 
 
82 While not directed specifically at the U.S. military justice system, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Newton, a 
member of the U.S. delegation to the Preparatory Commission on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, has written an excellent article on the Rome Statute’s complementarity provisions.  He 
undertakes an especially deep analysis of the interaction between domestic legal systems and ICC 
jurisdiction.  See Michael A. Newton, “Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent 
with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001). 
83 This historical overview is taken generally from that provided by: Brigadier General John S. Cooke, 
“Introduction: Fiftieth Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice Symposium Edition,” 165 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2000). 
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tribunals.  Their sole purpose was “to secure obedience to the commander”.84 While this 
was taken for granted during the early periods of the Republic’s history when the 
standing armed forces were small and not generally based near major population centers, 
the mobilization associated with World War II and the Cold War made military justice an 
issue touching a far greater portion of the population.85 Inevitably, it became a political 
issue.86 The UCMJ grew out of a political realization that “discipline cannot be 
maintained without justice”, and that the new realities of the service required that justice 
be modeled on civilian criminal procedure and its emphasis on due process.87 
In response to these concerns, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened a 
committee in 1948 under the chairmanship of Professor Edmund Morgan, Jr. of Harvard 
Law School.88 The committee was responsible for drafting a code that would be 
“uniform in substance and uniform in interpretation and construction”89 that would be 
applied to each of the armed services.  The result was the Code submitted to the Congress 
in 1949, and signed into law in 1950 with only slight modifications.90 
The Department of Defense was particularly keen to preserve the efficiency of 
“military functions” in the new Code, with special emphasis on the ability of 
commanders to maintain discipline in the field.91 The UCMJ established significant 
rights for service members accused of crimes and limited commanders’ control over the 
 
84 Id. at 3. 
85 During World War II, for instance, more than 4 million courts-martial were convened, and the resulting 
social impact was great.  Major General William A. Moorman, “Fifty Years of Military Justice: Does the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice Need to be Changed?,” 48 A. F. L. REV. 185, 187 (2000). 
86 Id., at 6-7.  See S. Rep. 81-486, P.L. 81-506, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Sen. Report Number 81-
486, June 10, 1949 (hereafter “Senate Report”) at 2225. 
87 Cooke, supra note 76, at 8. 
88 Senate Report, supra note 78, at 2225. 
89 Id. 
90 Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 108 (1950). 
91 See the statement of Sec. Forrestal in Senate Report, supra note 78, at 2265. 
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outcome of courts-martial.  But it did not eliminate the central role of commanders, since 
that role was considered essential to maintaining discipline among service members. 
The goal of the UCMJ was to balance this important principle of commander control – 
and the resulting unit discipline that separates a modern, responsible army from a rag-tag 
militia – with the interests of the accused to a trial according with modern understandings 
of due process.92 
The Code that resulted from these concerns continues to govern the situation 
today, where commanders continue to play an enormous role in the administration of 
military justice.  They appoint investigating officers; select the court members (the 
military equivalent of a jury)93; decide which parties and witnesses get immunity and 
review the findings of the court-martial for approval.94 
The commander’s extensive authority is tempered by significant constraints.  
First, the convening authority is guided by the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, an 
attorney trained in military law who reviews and prepares advice for the commander at 
each stage of a court-martial.  Second, for any serious crime a military judge presides 
over the proceedings, ruling on evidence, overseeing the seating of the court members, 
and with full authority to dismiss charges for multiplicity or considerations of equity, and 
to enter a finding of “not guilty” if he believes that any charge has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.95 Third, the UCMJ provides criminal penalties for unlawful 
 
92 Beth Hillman, Legal Affairs, Chains of Command, May-June 2002, page 50. 
93 UCMJ Article 25. 
94 A convening authority may grant immunity to witnesses, but by doing so disqualifies himself from post-
conviction review proceedings, a role then taken on by another officer.  Both powers, however, are 
substantial.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Hillman, 2 M.J. 830 (ACMR 1976), see also U.S. v. Kennedy, 8 M.J. 577 
(ACMR 1979). 
95 Theodore Essex and Leslea Tate Pickle, “A Reply to the Report of the Commission on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (May 2001): ‘the Cox Commission,’” 52 A.F.L.R. 
233, 237 (2002). 
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command influence over the court-martial96 and allows the military judge to remove a 
commander from his duties as the convening authority if he is found to be biased.97 
Finally, the U.S. military justice system provides for an extensive appeals process.  Any 
case resulting in punitive discharge or confinement for a year or more is automatically 
appealed to the service Court of Criminal Appeals.98 Further appeals may be heard by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Service, an Article I civilian court with 
five judges appointed for 15-year terms99, which is empowered to review the findings of 
courts-martial de novo.100 Further review is available to the Supreme Court of the United 
States by writ of certiorari.  It is worth noting that the Congress had special confidence in 
the ability of this appellate hierarchy to temper abuses of command discretion.101 
UCMJ Article 60 and Command Clemency 
There is significant pressure to further limit the scope of command discretion, but 
importantly, almost none of it is directed at commanders’ ability to grant clemency.  
Rather, complaints are based in concern for the due process rights of the accused, not out 
 
96 “No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-martial, nor any other commanding 
officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, 
with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercises of tis 
or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings.  No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce 
or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any 
member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, 
approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts…”  UCMJ Article 37. 
97 Convening authorities have been removed when there was a perception that their Staff Judge Advocate 
was biased (United States v. Johnson-Saunders, 48 M.J. 74 (1998)); where the convening authority had 
personally found probably cause and authorized a search (United States v. Wilson, 1 M.J. 694 (1975)); for 
potential personal bias (United States v. Hernandez, 3 M.J. 916 (A.C.M.R. 1977)); and for personal 
remarks (United States v. Nix, 40 M.J. 6 (C.M.A. 1994).  See Essex and Pickle, supra note 87, at 246-247. 
98 Art. 66.  For a review of the post-conviction procedures available in the United States Military, see James 
B. Roan and Cynthia Buxton, “The American Military Justice System in the New Millennium,” 52 AFLR 
185, 209-211 (2002). 
99 10 U.S.C. 942.   
100 Id. The Court has a particular tendency to heavily examine cases before it, including “traditionally 
review[ing] meritorious issues that were not assigned by an appellant or his counsel.”  United States v. 
Ortiz, 24 M.J. 323, 325 (C.M.A. 1987). 
101 Essex and Pickle, supra note 87, at 5. 
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of worries that crimes are being under-prosecuted.  The most extensive and authoritative 
criticism of the role of commanders under the UCMJ came out of a commission created 
by the National Institute of Military Justice under the chairmanship of Senior Judge 
Walter T. Cox, III, who had recently stepped down from the position of Chief Judge of 
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.102 The so-called Cox Commission’s report 
criticized the extent of command decision-making in the court-martial process, with 
special emphasis on the selection of the court members.103 The concerns largely center 
on the “impression of unfairness created by the role of convening authorities in military 
justice.”104 The Report referred to the current practice whereby commanders appoint the 
members of the court as “an invitation to mischief [insofar as it] permits – indeed, 
requires – a convening authority to choose the persons responsible for determining the 
guilt or innocence of a servicemember who has been investigated and prosecuted at the 
order of that same authority.”105 Finally, the Report opined that “[t]he combined power 
of the convening authority to determine which charges shall be preferred, the level of 
court-martial, and the venue where the charges will be tried, coupled with the idea that 
this same convening authority selects the members of the court-martial to try the cases, is 
unacceptable in a society that deems due process of law to be the bulwark of a fair justice 
system.”106 While largely concerned with the rights of the accused, the Report still noted 
that “in order to maintain a disciplinary system as well as a justice system commanders 
 
102 Cox Commission Report, supra note 3. 
103 Id. at Sec. III(a).  But see Essex and Pickle, supra note 87, at 244 (noting that the convening authority 
has a statutory responsibility to pick the “best qualified” persons when selecting the members of a court-
martial). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. This view is by no means universal, however.  See Christopher W. Behan, “Don’t Tug on 
Superman’s Cape: in Defense of Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel 
Members,” 176 MIL. L. REV. 190 (2003). 
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must have a significant role in the prosecution of crime at courts-martial.”107 The Report, 
and similar complaints,108 point yet again to the fundamental tension between the role of 
commanders as the sources of battlefield discipline, and the need for an independent 
justice system that protects the accused. 
This balance can be found throughout the UCMJ,109 but is perhaps most striking 
in the case of Article 60.110 There, the convening authority111 is given authority to set 
aside any finding of guilt by a court-martial, change a finding of guilt on a particular 
charge to a guilty verdict on a lesser charge, or downwardly modify any sentence 
imposed by the court-martial.112 This absolute clemency power is exercised as a “sole 
command prerogative,”113 but may only be used to the advantage of the accused.114 This 
is its only constraint. 
Article 60 gives a very broad discretion to commanders.  While they already are 
tasked with convening courts-martial (and are given the implied authority to choose not 
to do so) it is quite another thing to allow them to simply disregard the findings of a duly 
 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., Beth Hillman, Legal Affairs, Chains of Command, May-June 2002, page 50.;  see also Captain 
Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: the Cox Commission 
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. Rev. Mich. St. U. Det. C. 
L. 57, (2002).  
109 While the accused enjoyed newfound rights to counsel, an independent “law officer” (later military 
judge) who could rule on questions of evidence, and an inviolable right to exoneration by a finding of “not 
guilty,” commanders maintain enormous discretion in criminal matters under the UCMJ.  Specifically, they 
determine whether to convene a court-martial, maintain sole jurisdiction over lesser offenses with light 
penalties, choose the members of a general-court-martial (the equivalent of the jury in a civilian case), and 
have unrestricted authority to overturn findings of guilt.  See Letter of Sec. Forrestal in Senate Report, 
supra note 78, at 2265. 
110 10 U.S.C. 860. 
111 A term of art designating the military officer who convened the court-martial.  Under current law, this 
privilege is limited to the President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the relevant service, or commanding 
officer of the accused’s brigade/fleet (generally a general or flag officer).  Lesser officers may be 
empowered to convene courts-martial by order of the President or the relevant service secretary.  10 U.S.C. 
822. 
112 10 U.S.C. 860(c)(2)-(3) 
113 Id. at 860(c)(1).  The legislative history is explicit in stating that the convening authority “may disprove 
a finding or a sentence for any reason.”  Senate Report, supra, note 78, at 2253. 
114 Id. at 860(e)(2). 
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constituted judicial panel.  In the civilian context, such authority is granted only to the 
chief executive (the governor in the case of state offenses, or the President for federal 
crimes).  Even there, the power is granted not by statute, but as a constitutional 
prerogative rooted in the historical role of the monarch.115 Here, it is an institutional part 
of the process: the accused has a right to seek review by the convening authority, whose 
decision must be guided and informed by a report prepared for the purpose – a significant 
investment of judicial resources that underscores the centrality of command review of 
courts-martial.  Similarly, while traditional executive clemency is centralized in the chief 
constitutional executive, here it is devolved at least to the level of a brigade or fleet/base 
commander.  Thus, taking the example of the United States Navy, well over 100 officers 
have statutory authority to convene courts-martial, and thus Article 60 authority to nullify 
the findings thereof116 – and this number could be expanded substantially by order of the 
Secretary of the Navy. 
 Most of the concerns over the UCMJ have been with its procedural fairness for 
the accused.  While command discretion does present concerns, little has been said about 
this institutionalized ability of commanders under the UCMJ to shield those under their 
command from criminal prosecution.117 While the ability of commanding officers to 
maintain discipline and unit effectiveness by summarily punishing their subordinates has 
been tempered, they retain their ability to govern morale and unit cohesion through the 
judicious use of leniency.  Put simply, the UCMJ’s procedural innovations may have 
rendered the commander’s stick less sturdy, but his carrots remains intact. 
 
115 See Ronald C. Slye; The Legitimacy of Amnesties under International Law and General Principles of 
Anglo-Saxon Law: is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?”, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 236 (2002). 
116 There are currently over 200 officers of appropriate rank. 
117 See, e.g., Gierke, supra n. 10 at 253 (noting several other areas of command influence where action has 
been suggested).  
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Commanders’ Discretion and the Danger of ICC Prosecution 
 A Commander’s discretion in matters of military discipline, firmly rooted in the 
history of military governance, has potentially enormous ramifications for international 
criminal law.  As discussed above, the International Criminal Court is required to defer to 
investigations or prosecutions undertaken in good faith by governments.  In the military 
context, however, even a good faith prosecution comporting in every way with the letter 
and spirit of the half-century-old UCMJ will implicate command discretion.   
 How, then, should this command discretion be characterized?  The closest parallel 
appears to be pardons.  In international law pardons are issued after a person has been 
found guilty of criminal conduct.118 They remove the punishment attached to a finding of 
guilt – sometimes after a portion of a sentence has been served.  Convening authority 
action fits this model well: a court-martial has already publicly passed on the guilt of a 
defendant before Article 60 even comes into play.  The central question, then, is whether 
pardons are consistent with the statute of the ICC.  If they are, then the Court will likely 
defer to an Article 60 action, and consider itself precluded from trying the underlying 
case.  If not, the ICC will view any court-martial where the convening authority invokes 
Article 60 as potentially not a “genuine prosecution” within the meaning of the Rome 
Statute’s complementarity provision. 
 The Rome Statute makes no reference to the possibility of pardons or other forms 
of clemency such as amnesties.  This is a stunning omission given the significant debate 
over the role of amnesties and similar actions in post-conflict states – and related 
concerns over the possibility of impunity for those involved in serious crimes in those 
 
118 Slye, supra note 107, at 22. 
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states and globally.119 During the drafting of the Rome Statute, attempts to gain ICC 
jurisdiction over cases involving paroled, pardoned, or amnestied defendants were not 
successful.120 Some states believed that the Court should not be allowed to intervene in 
the political decisions of a State, whereas others did not believe a specific provision was 
necessary.121 These latter believed that the Court had sufficient authority under the Rome 
Statute’s admissibility standards to review cases where an amnesty or pardon was 
undertaken in “bad faith.”122 While some states’ ratification instruments especially 
reserved the right to issue amnesties123, the result is that the Rome Statute has no explicit 
rules on the subject.   
 However, the text of the admissibility standards does give some guidance.  Article 
17 can be read as stating that the Court “shall determine that a case is inadmissible 
where… [t]he case is being investigated.”  This would suggest that, at a minimum, if a 
state fails even to investigate a charge the case would be admissible.  Of course, pardons 
in general follow not only an investigation, but an actual finding of guilt.  This is 
 
119 This is a particularly vibrant debate in the international and human rights law communities and well 
beyond the scope of this paper.  I mean only to show that the debate exists, and that an anti-amnesty side 
exists for the ICC to join, should it wish to.  See, generally, Slye, supra note 107 (arguing that while 
“international law and the domestic legal practice of states at times permit, and even – in some cases – 
requires, amnesties” this should not be true for serious human rights violations); Naomi Roht-Arriaza and 
Lauren Gibson, “The Developing Jurisprudence of Amnesty,” 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 843 (1998) (arguing for a 
general prohibition on amnesties in the case of international criminal offenses but noting several contrary 
national court decisions); Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime,” 100 YALE L. J. 2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “State Responsibility to 
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law,” 78 CAL. L. REV. 449 
(1990); Steven R. Ratner, “New Democracies, Old Atrocities: an Inquiry in International Law,” 87 GEO. L. 
J. 707 (1999) (discussing a “generalized duty of accountability” in international law). 
120 John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of 
the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results 41, 59-60 (Roy S. Lee, Ed., 1999). 
121 Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law, 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 869, 941-942 (2002). 
122 Id. 
123 See Dwight G. Newman, “The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a 
Distributive Problem,” 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293 (2005) (discussing, in particular reservation by 
Colombia). It also bears noting that the first ICC investigation was undertaken in a state, Uganda, that had 
an amnesty in place.  Id. 
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especially true in an UCMJ Article 60 context.  The Court’s jurisdiction over a defendant 
benefiting from command clemency could not, therefore, be based on this reading of 
Article 17. 
 Similarly, the ne bis in iden provisions of the Rome Statute’s Article 20 provide 
that “no person who has been tried by another court… shall be tried by the [International 
Criminal Court] with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other 
court” were intended to shield the defendant from criminal liability.124 This provision 
clearly put the emphasis on the actual proceeding that led to conviction.  Since a pardon 
follows such a conviction, the actual proceeding may have indeed been conducted with 
the intention of securing conviction and punishment, only to have a later action mitigate 
that punishment.  Read strictly, if the proceeding itself were legitimate and genuine, the 
ICC would be powerless to act. 
 Two points, however, suggest otherwise.  First, the entire thrust of the Rome 
Statute is to prevent states from shielding persons responsible for the gravest crimes from 
criminal responsibility.  The Court may very well choose not to read Article 20 so 
strictly.  It can do this in one of two ways: by reading the term “proceeding” broadly to 
include the appellate and executive action taken on a case, or by reading a subsequent 
pardon as evidence of the lack of required intent to bring the accused to justice.125 This 
last interpretation may be mitigated if the authority overseeing the trial itself is separate 
from that granting a pardon – as, for example, in a system of divided powers such as the 
United States’ civilian courts.126 But in the context of Article 60, the UCMJ runs into a 
serious problem on this front: because the convening authority both exercises control 
 
124 ICC Statute Article 20 (all emphasis added). 
125 See Holmes, supra note 111. 
126 ICC Statute, Article 20(3). 
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over the proceedings (by selecting the court members, choosing the charges, etc.) and
grants clemency, concerns that the underlying proceedings were intended simply to lead 
to a pardon and, thus, defeat ICC jurisdiction are at the very least conceivable.127 
The Court, then, will have to fashion a rule in this area.  Its judges should be 
guided first by the suggestions outlined above, namely, that the text and history of the 
Rome Statute suggest that the criminal proceeding itself should be the focus of the court’s 
inquiry.  This is especially true since the Court must look to whether a state court’s 
proceedings were conducted according to “the principles of due process recognized by 
international law.”128 While states have an independent responsibility to prosecute those 
responsible for certain crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court (or extradite them to 
others to try them)129 it should be noted that there are few areas where this is true.130 
Importantly, the Court should be informed by the common presence of pardoning powers 
in the municipal legal systems of states.  Thus, while the Court’s duty to look at 
international standards of due process is only one factor to which the Court must “have 
 
127 There is also, of course, an independent responsibility to prosecute certain crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, such as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  A decision to pardon such a grave breach 
may be seen as particularly good evidence of a desire to shield the accused given the independent 
obligation under international law to punish and deter such abuses under Common Article I of the 
Conventions.   See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick and Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Geneva 
Convention I). Each Geneva Convention includes a provision identical to Article 49 in Geneva Convention 
I mentioned above. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
(Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
(Geneva Convention IV). 
128 ICC Statute, Article 17. 
129 See note 118, supra. 
130 While the Torture Convention specifically requires states to punish violations of individuals’ rights, 
most human rights treaties do not contain such provisions.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 6 ILM 368 (1966) (available online at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm); 
see generally Diane Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime,” 100 Yale L.J. 2537 (1991).  
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regard” in determining a case’s admissibility, that factor can be seen as weighing in favor 
of honoring pardons. 
 However, the teleological arguments from the Rome Statute remain powerful: the 
ICC was clearly intended to punish the worst individual offenders of international law.131 
Interpretations that make this impossible are likely to be rejected by the Court.  But it 
should be remembered that the Court must determine whether a particular crime is “not 
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”132 Given the likely severe 
constraints on its resources, the Court will have to be careful in selecting cases of 
“sufficient gravity,” a standard that allows the ICC significant discretion in managing its 
own docket.  
 The Court should consider the advantages of trial followed by pardon, including 
the truth-finding role played by trials, the clear and unambiguous condemnation of the 
underlying behavior by a competent tribunal, and the real costs to the accused that flow 
from public conviction.  A finding that a person committed serious crimes in the context 
of war will have a serious effect, will create precedent within the state, and will serve as a 
deterrent to others who do not want to undergo the ordeal that a public trial on such 
charges involves.  A trial followed by pardon, especially pardon that simply reduces 
rather than eliminates the sentence, is a far sight better than simple impunity.  The Court 
may well see this as a significant enough difference – especially given the concerns 
outlined above concerning the emphasis on the proceedings instead of the result, and the 
prevalence of pardons in municipal legal systems – to concentrate its efforts on cases 
where no reasonable trial was undertaken, no condemnation was made, and no costs 
 
131 See ICC Statute, Preamble.  (“Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes”) (emphasis in original). 
132 ICC Statute, Article 17(1)(d). 
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accrued to the lawbreaker.  This is especially attractive in the arena of military law 
where, in addition to the above concerns, issues of unit cohesion, command 
responsibility, and military discipline support the use of a wider clemency power than is 
available in a civilian context. 
 On the other hand, the United States must realize that allowing the convening 
authority both significant control over the court-martial itself and the right to take post-
conviction action conflates clemency with the original proceeding.  This undermines any 
argument based on the Rome Statute’s concentration on the legitimacy of the underlying 
proceeding by contaminating it with the subsequent clemency action.  Amending the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice to require that someone other than the convening 
authority exercise article 60 powers, or by giving the professional Judge Advocates 
General corps (which operates on a separate chain of command from field officers) 
greater control over the actual court-martial in such key areas as charge and court-
member selection, would go a long way towards ensuring that the ICC will decline 
jurisdiction over cases where UCMJ Article 60 has been invoked.  Consequently, such 
changes would help bring American military law into line with the rapidly developing 
demands of international criminal law while simultaneously having the least effect on the 
principles of command responsibility, unit cohesion, and military discipline that serve a 
special role in the government of military forces.  
 
Conclusion 
 Traditionally, the level of command influence over U.S. courts-martial has been 
the result of a compromise.  On one hand, commanders argued that their ability to 
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discipline members of their units was central to unit effectiveness and cohesion.  On the 
other, considerations of humanity and democratic sensitivities argued strongly for a more 
robust view of military due process.  The creation of an International Criminal Court lifts 
this debate out of its traditional domestic context and injects considerations of 
international law and the politics of international institutions.  If the United States is to 
give effect to its strong policy of avoiding ICC jurisdiction, it must continue to pursue a 
range of political and diplomatic strategies.  Among these should be an attempt to find 
safe harbor in the complementarity principle central to the Court’s international role.  
Such a strategy may require us to rethink the terms of our domestic debate over the role 
of commanders in military justice. 
